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LIABILITY OF THE STATE FOR ILLEGAL CONDUCT OF ITS ORGANS. By 
The Max-Planck-Institut filr Ausliindisches offentliches Recht und 
Volkerrecht. Koln, Germany: Carl Heymanns Verlag KG. Pp. xxiii, 
899. 
The Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign Public Law and Inter-
national Law presents in this volume twenty-seven reports prepared 
for an international colloquium held at Heidelberg in July 1964. 
Twenty of these reports describe and discuss the law of state liability 
in more than twenty different states, mostly European but including 
also the United States, Australia, Japan, Latin America and South 
Africa. The purpose of the colloquium was "to proceed with the 
comparative studies of problems of public law" which started in 
1960 with a colloquium on the "Guarantee, Limitation and Requisi-
tion of Private Property," followed by a second colloquium in 1962 
concerned with "Constitutional Review in the World To-day." The 
basic material for such comparative studies is to be found in the 
national legal systems of as many countries as possible, at least insofar 
as they can offer an interesting contribution to the solution of the 
problem under study. The task of the Institute was therefore in the 
first place to select a group of states and gather the necessary informa-
tion, which efforts have produced the numerous reports on the law 
of state liability in different states which fill about four-fifths of the 
volume under review. 
These national surveys constitute the raw material upon which 
the actual comparative study was built. Indeed, the value of this 
volume lies in the fact that the Max-Planck-Institute not only 
gathered a significant quantity of information from competent 
sources but actually put it to use in several comparative studies by 
Jaenicke and the staff members of the Institute. These comparative 
studies will be examined later in this review in some detail, but it is 
essential to start with a brief analysis of the way in which the basic 
material was gathered. 
The national reports were written by an expert (university pro-
fessor, judge, or lawyer) from the particular state under discussion 
on the basis of a questionnaire formulated by the Institute. This 
questionnaire dealt primarily with nine subjects: the concept of state 
liability, the conditions of substantive law for liability, liability for 
certain typical activities, exclusion and limitaton of liability, com-
pensation, procedural law for claims, liability for legislative acts, 
liability for activities of the judiciary, and finally the personal liability 
of persons acting on behalf of the state. 
Of particular importance were the definitions given by the 
drafters of this questionnaire to key terms such as "illegal conduct." 
The latter was defined so as to include only acts or omissions that 
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deviate from conduct prescribed or authorized by law (p. 8). I£ "law" 
were to be taken in the sense of "statute" [ as in fact it was some years 
ago in certain countries (p. 491)], this definition would be far too 
restrictive; however, from the German and French texts and from 
the remarks made by Mosler at the beginning of the book it becomes 
clear that in this definition the term "law" has a very broad meaning 
and includes any written or unwritten rule which imposes obligations 
upon the state. Thus the report on the French legal system mentions 
that an act is "illicite" in the first place when it is contrary to the 
obligation of efficiency (bon fonctionnement) in the administration 
and, only second, when it violates statutory obligations (p. 151). 
Under Dutch law the distinction between acts that violate written 
law (legal rules) and acts that are incompatible with suitable care 
(p. 491)-that is, the standards of conduct not imposed by statute 
or administrative regulation but by what one could call "decency"-
is not to be confounded with the distinction between common law 
and statute [which determines illegality in the United States (p. 685)], 
since in the latter case the obligation is more or less clearly "formu-
lated"; in the case of "decency" this is not generally so. 
The use of a questionnaire for the gathering of the basic material 
obviously has great advantages. Yet it can create somewhat artificial 
divisions and, in certain cases, exclude particular but important 
aspects of a given national system. With this questionnaire, however, 
enough latitude was left to the contributors to deal with specific 
problems. Whatever the drawback., the invaluable advantage of the 
questionnaire system is, in the first place, that it makes it possible 
to obtain information on well-defined issues while excluding informa-
tion on those which appear less relevant; in the second place-and 
this is essential for a comparative law study-the actual "comparing" 
of different national solutions for a given problem becomes prac-
ticable. 
As was mentioned before, the great merit of the present publica-
tion is not so much that it has gathered and made available an im-
posing amount of well-ordered material but that it has undertaken 
a comparative study of certain aspects of the question of state lia-
bility. By doing this, the Institute hopes not merely to contribute to 
comparative law in general, but actually to accomplish a practical 
task, namely, to provide the courts, primarily the international courts, 
with a definition of certain "general principles of law." As Mosler 
recalls in his introduction, the provisions of the European Com-
munities' Treaties (articles 215 of the Economic Community and 
188 of the Euratom Treaty) were chosen as a starting point. Under 
these provisions the Communities are required to make reparation 
for damage caused by their institutions or by their employees in the 
performance of their duties "in accordance ·with the general princi-
ples common to the laws of the Member States." The application of 
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these provisions by the organs of the Community, especially by the 
Court of Justice, presupposes the knowledge and the comparison of 
the law of state liability in force in the six member states. Thus, apart 
from their intrinsic value, the results of the comparative description 
of national legal systems provide practical advantages for the ap-
plication of law by the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities, and, since the material gathered by the Institute goes 
far beyond the Community Member States, it also presents practical 
advantages for the International Court of Justice which is bound by 
its Statute to apply the "general principles of law." 
Without questioning in the least the quality of the questionnaire 
and of the national reports based thereon, the practitioner of inter-
national law and of comparative law (who in the eyes of the Institute 
is to be the main beneficiary of this publication) is .bound to wonder 
whether the objective of the colloquium, as it was defined in the 
questionnaire, was not in fact overambitious. Did the organizers of 
the colloquium really think that state liability as a whole could be 
treated in twenty-to-fifty-page reports in such a way as to permit the 
drawing of general conclusions in the form of "principles" of law? 
When one examines the headings of the nine subdivisions of the 
questionnaire, one is inclined to suggest that each one of them alone 
offered sufficient material for at least one colloquium. Bound as 
they were by the questionnaire but necessarily limited as to space, 
the drafters of the national surveys could do no more than give a 
general and broad picture of the respective national legal systems, 
and these reports therefore constitute, thanks to their high quality, 
invaluable contributions to a first approach to the problem of state 
liability. But to use this raw material as a sufficient basis for defining 
general principles of law to be applied by courts seems a quite 
different matter. It might be useful in this respect to quote a passage 
from a judgment of the European Court of Justice regarding this 
matter. In the case Algera v. Assembly, the court held that the treaty 
did not provide a solution for the problem with which it was faced 
and stated that it was therefore "obliged to solve it by basing itself 
upon the rules of law recognized by the statutes, the doctrine and the 
case-law of the Member States" (Recueil 111, p. 115). In other words, 
each particular problem calls for a study of all available national 
sources before an attempt can be made to formulate a rule of law. 
Knowing the practice of the Court of Justice, it would appear that 
the material gathered in the different national reports published by 
the Institute would not constitute a sufficient basis for defining 
general principles of law concerning all the subjects referred to in 
the questionnaire. The Institute itself is obviously conscious of this 
difficulty and, as will be seen below, the attempt to formulate general 
rules was limited to a very few subjects (p. 859). 
Because of the limited scope of the national reports the compara-
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tive studies carried out by the Institute could not encompass all the 
aspects of state liability defined in the questionnaire. On the other 
hand, whatever the drawbacks of a questionnaire which introduces 
more or less artificial subdivisions, the latter are a conditio sine qua 
non for any comparative work. The study of the national reports 
revealed that some questions were less suitable for comparison while 
others seemed less fundamental for an understanding of the problem 
under study. Consequently, only four subjects were chosen for dis-
cussion at the colloquium, and comparative reports on these sub-
jects were prepared by members of the Institute. These comparative 
reports constitute, without doubt, the most valuable contribution 
of the book. 
The first comparative report by Steinberger (pp. 7 53-67) examines 
the illegal conduct of state organs as a basic element of state liability. 
The author notes in the first place that state liability can only exist 
when certain basic conditions are fulfilled: absence of immunity, 
existence of a damage, absence of legal grounds for imputing the 
damage to the victim, responsibility of the state, and faulty action of 
the organ. However interesting, such findings seem much too general 
to be more than a very first approach to the problem, although the 
reader must remember that the sole aim of the reports prepared by 
the Institute's staff was to introduce the discussion. Nevertheless, it 
is to be regretted that so much assembled basic material did not 
permit a more thorough approach of the few questions which were 
singled out for discussion. 
Essential for the problem under consideration is the relationship 
between the state and the organ, and in this respect the author of the 
report finds that a person or institution acts on behalf of the state 
only when there exists an employment or agency relationship, tem-
porary or permanent. Furthermore, all the legal systems examined 
in the national reports require a nexus between the discharge of a 
function on behalf of the state and the causing of damage. Also 
interesting is the author's conclusion that the legal consequences 
are the same in systems where state liability is considered a question 
of public administrative law and where it is treated as a private law 
matter. 
Steinberger further examines the crucial question of the grounds 
for illegality of acts causing a damage. As was pointed out at the 
beginning of this review, there was no doubt in the minds of the 
drafters of the questionnaire as to the inclusive meaning of the term 
"law," which was intended to deal with violations not only of statutes 
but also of as yet undefined general obligations. On the other hand, 
however, it appears that in all the national legal systems examined 
such violations only result in liability for the state when the object 
of the obligation is to protect the interests of the victim. In common-
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law countries this requirement is called a "breach of duty towards the 
victim." In this connection, the author briefly mentions the question 
of "detournement de pouvoir," and here also one can only regret 
that nothing was said about this typical continental aspect of ad-
ministrative law. 
As to the question of fault, Steinberger finds it impossible to 
draw a general conclusion, since the various systems differ widely. 
Such a conclusion, however, might not be so far off in the future if 
the tendency toward strict liability, which can be seen in many legal 
systems, develops further. The author wonders whether the require-
ment of fault as an element of state liability is still justifiable in our 
modern world; this comparative essay thus ends by opening wide 
projects for future development. 
The second comparative report concerns the exclusion of state 
liability for acts of the administration and of the judiciary (pp. 768-
75). The author notes that liability for acts of government (policy-
making decisions) is excluded in very few states, including France 
and the United States, where judicial control over such acts is con-
sidered detrimental to efficient government. Moreover, with very few 
exceptions, the liability of the state is not excluded for acts of a 
military nature (sole exception: the United States) and sovereign 
acts of the administration (police, public education, and so forth). 
On the other hand, the great majority of states do exclude liability 
for acts of the judiciary. 
A third, very short comparative report concerns the liability of 
the state for legislative acts. As the author points out, this kind of 
liability can, of course, only exist where the courts are empowered 
to examine the legality of statutes. In most cases, however, courts 
are only competent with regard to administrative regulations based 
on laws; damage caused by such administrative acts comes within 
the scope of state liability. In fact, only in Greece is liability of the 
state for damage caused by statutes clearly recognized; on the other 
hand, liability for illegal administrative acts is widely admitted. 
In a fourth report, Bleckmann attempts to draw some conclusions 
with regard to the nature and extent of reparation. It appears that 
generally speaking only financial reparation is provided, although 
there are cases of restitution in natura. As to the extent of the repara-
tion, the author notes that most legal systems exclude indirect 
damages. The question of causation of the damage by the illegal 
conduct of the state's organ is only briefly mentioned. Although this 
question is essential with regard to the possibility of obtaining com-
pensation, it is not discussed in any detail. As for immaterial damage, 
the solution varies from state to state, and a general principle is 
impossible to elicit. Finally, Bleckmann also notes that reparation of 
indirect damages is provided for in four states and excluded in a 
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number of others and in the European Communities. He adds that 
"this finding is absolutely useless since one can give, on the basis of 
the national reports, at least three different definitions of the term 
direct" (p. 781). 
Without implying that a similar conclusion necessarily applies to 
all the results of comparative studies of this kind, one is led to won-
der, after reading the comparative essays made on the basis of the 
twenty national reports, whether the aim the organizers of the col-
loquium were pursuing is, in fact, attainable. In the final report of 
this volume, Jaenicke defines this aim once again as a practical rather 
than a theoretical one, that is, an indirect normative function con-
sisting in supplementing the incompleteness of a legal system by 
reference to the general principles of law contained in other systems 
(p. 859). Insofar as it explicitly attempts to define "general principles 
of law" on the basis of the material gathered for and during the dis-
cussions, Jaenicke's report fulfills an essential function. There is no 
doubt that it is possible to come to a conclusion on specific questions 
when it appears from all the national reports that, for example, lia-
bility for legislative acts is generally excluded. In such a case it seems 
justifiable to speak of a general legal principle. But these cases are 
extremely few. 
For all the other questions one has to look for the ratio legis upon 
which the various rules are based, and it is only when there appears 
to be concordance of the motives that one can venture to speak about 
general rules. Jaenicke attempts to apply this rule to certain aspects 
of state liability and proposes a certain number of general principles 
(pp. 868, 872, and 877). Yet if the method used to arrive at these con-
clusions seems perfectly acceptable, a certain doubt remains as to the 
basic material and the problems attempted to be solved. After read-
ing the conclusions of the colloquium and examining the national 
reports, one comes to the conclusion that the subject under dis-
cussion is actually much too vast, and that the national report is 
therefore necessarily somewhat too superficial to allow drawing the 
kind of conclusions contained in the last report. With this reserva-
tion in mind, and under the condition that the reader is familiar 
with German, French, as well as English, legal terminology, one 
can only be thankful to the Max-Planck-Institute for having put 
at the disposal of international lawyers such valuable and well classi-
fied material which undoubtedly will encourage further study. 
Pierre Mathijsen, 
Service Juridique de la 
Commission des Communautes 
Europeennes. 
